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Consolidation for Desegregation: The
Unresolved Issue of the Inevitable Sequel
In a rare moment of equipoise, the United States Supreme Court
on May 21, 1973, in Bradley v. School Board [Richmond]' ended twelve
years of school desegregation litigation in Richmond, Virginia, by re-
fusing to reinstate a court-ordered consolidation of city and suburban
school divisions. By dividing equally, however, the eight-man Court2
proffered no opinion in the case termed an "inevitable sequel"
3 to
Brown v. Board of Education [Brown 1].4 Its affirmance is conclusive
and binding on the parties to the Richmond suit, 5 and the court of
appeals opinion is controlling in the Fourth Circuit. The Supreme
Court's action, however, is not an authoritative precedent outside that
circuit.6
In addition to its lack of direct precedential authority, the court of
appeals opinion in Richmond is flawed by its confusion of the ex-
istence of a constitutional violation with the determination of the
appropriate scope of a remedial decree.7 The underlying issues of
school desegregation in metropolitan areas composed of more than one
political subdivision thus remain unresolved.
Moreover Richmond was only one of a number of suits seeking
consolidation of city and suburban school divisions.8 The Sixth Cir-
1. 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), a~f'd per curiam
by an equally divided Court, 93 S. Ct. 1952 (1973).
2. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision. 93 S. Ct. 1952 (1973).
He had previously disqualified himself because of prior membership on the Richmond
School Board, one of the petitioners, and on the Virginia State Board of Education, one
of the defendants. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1973, at 1, col. 5.
3. The phrase was used by Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold in the oral argument
of Richmond before the Court. 41 U.S.L.W. 3577, 3579 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1973).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [Brown 1] and 349 U.S. 294 (1935) [Brown 11"].
5. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942). On June 15, 1973, attorneys for the
Richmond plaintiffs did, however, file a petition for rehearing. The Richmond School
Board filed its petition for rehearing on July 14, 1973.
6. Id. See generally lB J. MooRE, FaDAL PRACE 4rca 040212], at 119 C2d ed. 1963).
7. See pp. 1683-84 infra.
8. Besides Richmond, the two most advanced consolidation cases involve desegregation
in Detroit and Indianapolis. The district court opinion in the Detroit case, Bradley v.
Milliken [Detroit], is embodied in four rulings and findings: Ruling on Issue of Segre-
gation, the primary opinion dated September 27, 1971, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich.
1971); Ruling on Propriety of Considering a 'Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish De-
segregation of the Public Schools of the City of Detroit, C.A. No. 33257 (E.D. Mich.
March 24, 1972); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of
Desegregation, C.A. No. 35257 (E.D. Mich. March 28, 1972); and Rulings on Desegregation
Area and Order for Development of Plan of Desegregation, June 14, 1972, 345 F. Supp.
914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). The Cour. of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, by a 6.3 margin,
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cuit's June 12, 1973, decision in Bradley v. Milliken [Detroit]9 empha-
sizes, despite the current equipoise at the Supreme Court level, the
need for reexamination of the relationship of duties and obligations
of state and local school officials. This Note will argue that the af-
firmative duty to desegregate must be placed where the Constitution
places it: upon the state.
I. The Requirement of a Constitutional Violation
The starting point for any school desegregation case is the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 The crucial trig-
ger for traditional Fourteenth Amendment cases"1 is official or "state
action" causing deprivation of equal protection of the laws.12 In the
three leading consolidation cases, Bradley v. School Board [Richmond],
Bradley v. Milliken [Detroit] and United States v. Board of School
Commissioners [Indianapolis],13 the trial courts made findings clearly
affirmed en banc the September 1971 Ruling on Issue of Segregation and the March 28,
1972, Findings, but vacated the other two decisions as well as an order dated July 11,
1972, directing purchase of 295 school buses, and remanded the case to the district court.
Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973). The court of appeals decision
reaches the same result as the vacated opinion of a Sixth Circuit panel filed December
8, 1972. Chief Judge Phillips wrote the majority opinion i'h the June 12, 1973, decision
and the only opinion in the vacated decision.
The Indianapolis case, United States v. Board of School Comm'rs [Indianapolis], 132
F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971), afJ'd, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1973), has itself had an ex.
tended procedural history. The School Town of Speedway, one of the areas potentially in.
volved in the consolidated school district, sought a writ of prohibition which was denied
by the Seventh Circuit and ultimately by the Supreme Court. School Town of Speedway
v. Dillin, 407 U.S. 920 (1972).
Metropolitan remedies are also under consideration in other areas. See, e.g., Calhoun
v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804, 809 (5th Cir. 1971), which deals with the continuing desegrega-
tion of the Atlanta public schools. The issue is also involved in suits filed in Boston,
Buffalo, Dayton, Durham, N.C., Grand Rapids, Mich., Hartford, Louisville, and WVil-
mington. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1973, § 4, at 3, col. 2. Earlier decisions bearing on the
metropolitan consolidation remedy include Haney v. County School Bd. of Educ, (W.D.
Ark. 1968), rev'd and remanded, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969), Order filed Aug. 7, 1969
(W.D. Ark.), vacated and remanded, 429 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970) (a Negro school district
within a county ordered consolidated with the rest of the county); Harrington v. Col-
quitt County Bd. of Educ., 460 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1972) (five predominantly white ele-
mentary schools outside the city of Moultrie, Georgia, included within the city school
district); United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd as modified
and remanded, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Edgar v. United States,
404 U.S. 1016 (1972) (state educational authorities required to come forward with desegre-
gation plans that included alteration of independent district boundaries where required).
9. Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973).
10. "No State shall make or enforce any law . . . nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV § 1.
11. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
12. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.-1, 16 (1971).
13. Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir.
1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 93 S. Ct. 1952 (1973); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F.
Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973); United
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establishing constitutional violations.14 Although these violations were
independent of the establishment and maintenance of interdistrict
boundaries, they included proscribed activities at both the local and
the state level.15
The general category of constitutional violation which each district
court sought to eliminate was the continued racial identifiability0
of schools and school divisions within a single metropolitan area"r
resulting from past and present discriminatory official acts. It was in
failing to affirm the district court's findings of constitutional violation
that the Fourth Circuit in Richmond utilized an improper test. The
majority there emphasized the absence of any finding of "joint inter-
action" between any of the political subdivisions for the purpose of
keeping one unit relatively white by confining blacks to another.is
Closely linked to this emphasis was the conclusion that only a "con-
stitutional violation in the establishment and maintenance of these
three school districts"' 9 would justify the remedy of consolidation.
But although the majority found no joint interaction, it did specifi-
cally approve the district court findings that all three municipalities
committed numerous acts of discrimination, " and that each formerly
operated a dual system of schools.2  Moreover, the court of appeals
States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971), aJI'd, 474 F.2d 81 (7th
Cir. 1973); see notes I and 8 supra. These three localities have broadly differing back.
grounds of official conduct respecting racial segregation. In Virginia, racial segregation in
all areas of life, and most particularly in public schools, was enforced by state statute. VA.
CODE § 22-221 (1950, repealed 1971), and the state constitution, VA. CoNs'. § 140 (repealed
1971), at least until 1954. Indiana, although it had a history of segregation. required de-
segregation on a phased basis by statute enacted in 1949. Acts 1949, ch. 186, at 603: Bunss
IND). STAT. ANN. §§ 28-6106 to 28-6112 (1970), as amended, IND. CODE §§ 20-4-1-7 to 20-4-1-13
(1971). Thus Indiana officially outlawed segregation some five )-ears prior to Brown 1.
Michigan, by contrast, never required, or by statute permitted, racial s-gregation in schools
or other public facilities.
14. The specific findings are discussed pp. 1684-86 infra.
15. See pp. 1685-86 infra. In Indianapolis, the state officials were added as parties to
the suit after the filing of the district court opinion. Nevertheless, the court alluded
to potential state violations, 332 F. Supp. at 675 passin and 679, and directed service of
process on the attorney general of Indiana. Id. at 680.
16. The Richmond district court opinion is replete with references to "racially iden.
tifiable" schools. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67 passim. The district judge termed it 'both
a legal concept-a conclusion of law, ultimately-and a fact of major significance to edu-
cators and lay persons." Id. at 80. Generally, racial identifiability is "a perception of
students, faculty and community perception" that certain schools or districts are black
"while others are white." Id.
17. This underlying unity of the metropolitan area is crucial to the Richmond district
court opinion. See, e.g., the reference to "a bi-racial community," id. at 80 (emphasis
added), to the "historic flexibility" and "cooperative operation" between the localities,
id. at 100, and the stable racial proportions within "the three jurisdictions together." id.
at 185. See also note 102 infra.
18. Richmond, 462 F.2d at 1065.
.19. Id. at 1069 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 1065, 1066.
21. Id. at 1065.
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did not specifically disapprove any other findings of the district court.
What it did conclude, in contradiction to the admissions of the Rich-
mond School Board and its own previously-noted approval of the dis-
trict court findings, was that "the last vestiges of state-imposed segre.
gation have been wiped out . . ." and that therefore "there is no con-
stitutional violation .... -22This conclusion could only be reached
by equating "constitutional violation" with "joint interaction," an
equation that improperly requires a finding of an illegal purpose or
motivation rather than a forbidden effect.23
The Sixth Circuit implicitly rejected this equation in Detroit. Al-
though the majority opinion made a point of distinguishing its hold-
ing from that of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Richmond2 4 its con-
clusion that the district court was not confined to the boundary lines




In elaborating on the general constitutional violations, the trial
courts in Richmond, Detroit and Indianapolis found and discussed
numerous specific acts of discrimination. Each court found that school
construction policy 27 and transportation of pupils 28 were widely used
to maintain segregated schoor systems. Local officials with state con-
currence selected school construction sites to coincide with patterns
of segregated housing,29 and reinforced the result by drawing attend-
ance zones to conform to such patterns.3 0 Discriminatory pupil assign-
ment practices often accentuated the resultant segregation. 31 Rich-
22. Id. at 1070.
23. See discussion in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972).
24. Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 at 66 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973).
25. Id. at 65.
26. See p. 1683 supra.
27. The importance of school construction in desegregation has been recognized in
numerous cases. See, e.g., Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); Brewer v. School Bd., 397 F.2d 37, 42 (4th Cir. 1968); United
States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125, 1133 (7th Cir. 1968).
28. Transportation, or "busing," has been approved as a desegregation tool. Swarm v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971).
29. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 86-87, 127 passim, 133 passim; Detroit, 338 F. Supp.
at 588; Indianapolis, 332 F. Supp. at 668-69.
30. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 78; Detroit, 338 F. Supp. at 588, 592-93; Indianapolis,
332 F. Supp. at 667.
31. Richmond continued to use a "freedom of choice" assignment plan until 1970,
Richmond, 317 F. Supp. 555, 557 (E.D. Va. 1970), well after the Supreme Court held
such plans to be of questionable effectiveness in Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
320 (1968). Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 70.
Detroit school officials bolstered their assignment policy by utilizing optional at.
tendance zones in transition areas of integrated housing. Detroit, 338 F. Supp. at 587.
Indianapolis also utilized optional attendance zones, 332 F. Supp. at 668-69, although such
use has been held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment in such cases as Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1969), afI'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175




mond and Detroit officials engaged in pupil exchanges with suburban
divisions32 while in Indianapolis, such divisions accepted fleeing city
pupils on a tuition basis. 3
3
The findings of constitutional violations were not confined to local
officials, even though such violations are imputed to the state.34 The
Richmond and Detroit trial courts made specific findings of violations
by the state defendants. 35 A finding that the ultimate responsibility
for public education resided in the state and not the local board was
the starting point of the inquiry.30 Discriminatory school financing
in Detroit,37 as well as concurrence by Virginia and Michigan offi-
cials in discriminatory. construction 38 and transportation policies,30
headed the list of violations specifically attributable to the state.
State statutes in each case directly and indirectly hampered desegre-
gation. Even after the end of Virginia's "massive resistance" to the
32. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 157; Detroit, Nos. 72-1809--72-1814 at 28.30 (6th Cir.
June 12, 1973).
33. Indianapolis, 332 F. Supp. at 667.
34. See pp. 1688-89 infra.
35. State officials were not defendants in the original Richmond litigation. However.
on November 4, 1970, the Richmond School Board filed a motion to compel joinder of
the state board of education and the individual members thereof and the state su-
perintendent of public instruction, as well as school boards, school officials and boards
of supervisors of the surrounding counties. The motion was granted December 5, 1970.
Richmond, 51 F.R.D. 139 (1970).
Detroit originally included the governor, attorney general, state board of education
and state superintendent of public instruction of the state of Michigan as defendants.
The district judge's original order dismissing the governor and attorney general was
reversed by the court of appeals. Detroit, 433 F.2d 897, 903 (6th Cir. 1970).
The state of Indiana was not a defendant in the original suit which was brought by
the United States under §§ 407(a) and (b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000c-6(a) & -6(b) as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Indiana Board
of Education and the superintendent of public instruction, as well as seven representative
school districts, were joined as defendants, however, after the filing of an amended com-
plaint on October 22, 1971.
36. See Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 93. 116; Detroit, 338 F. Supp. at 593.
37. Detroit, 338 F. Supp. at 589. Michigan provided state funds for pupil transporta.
tion in every school district but Detroit. Id. See also Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 at
42, 48 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973). Additionally, until 1969, Michigan limited Detroit's au-
thority for capital improvement bonding to two percent of assessed property %aluation.
while allowing a ceiling of five percent in all other school districts. 338 F. Supp. at 589.
38. In Virginia, state approval was required prior to beginning construction, and until
1965, the application for state construction funds had to state for which race the school
was being constructed. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 124-27.
The district court in Detroit found that, although the state board of education had
nominally encouraged school site selection as a tool of integration, "[t]he State defendants
have similarly failed to take any action to effectuate these policies." 338 F. Supp. at 589.
39. Michigan's involvement in maintaining a dual school system consisted of passive
acceptance of interdistrict busing to preserve segregation, Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814
at 43 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973). See also the vacated opinion of the Sixth Circuit panel,
Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 at 27-29, 42 (6th Cir. Dec. 8. 1972). Virginia officials, by
contrast, actively supported segregated schools. The district judge alluded to the point
by citing four previous cases. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 83, citing Buckner v. County
School Bd., 332 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1964); School Bd. v. Kilby, 259 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1958);
Corbin v. County School Bd., 177 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1949); Goins v. County School Bd..
186 F. Supp. 753 (W.D. Va. 1960).
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dictates of Brown1,40 the "purposeful frustration" of the desegregation
process4 ' continued. It included a statutory limitation of the state
board of education's power to consolidate school divisions during the
pendency of the Richmond suit which sought such consolidation."12
Likewise, a 1970 enactment of the Michigan legislature43 injected the
state into the Detroit desegregation process. 44 In Indianapolis, changes
in state statutes consolidated the city and surrounding Marion County
in virtually all aspects except schools.
45
The district courts in the three primary cases did not rule on the
sufficiency of any single act to trigger the court's remedial power. Each
court did, however, find that the cumulative effect of the local and
state actions and inactions violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 40
The courts of appeals in each case did not question the district judge's
findings of fact.
47
The most unsettled area of the trial court findings concerned resi-
dential segregation. Each district court placed particular emphasis
on housing pattern. 48 The Richmond and Detroit district courts found
state action violations in this area.49 The courts of appeals, however,
reached different conclusions about the significance of these findings
40. Virginia statutory and constitutional provisions requiring segregation in public
education, VA. CONST. § 140 (which remained in the constitution, although invalidated,
until the new state constitution became effective on July 1, 1971) and VA. CODE ANN.
§ 22-221 (which was repealed by [1971] Acts of Assembly, Ex. Sess. c.102), were invalidated
by Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 138 passim. See generally
R. GATES, THE MAKING OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1962).
41. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 94 passim.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-30 as amended by [1971] Acts of Assembly, Ex. Sess., c.220r.
This amendment restricted the previously unfettered power of the state board of educa.
tion to create school divisions composed of more than one political subdivision. Under
the current law the state board may act only upon request of the school boards with
the concurrence of the governing bodies of the affected school districts.
43. Act No. 48, § 12, [1970] Public Acts of- Michigan. The complaint in Detroit,
originally filed August 18, 1970, sought to enjoin the defendants from giving force and
effect to § 12. Detroit, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970). The statute by its terms applied "to
any first class school district." Detroit, however, was the only first class district in Michi.
gan. The court of appeals declared the section unconstitutional as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
44. See Detroit, 338 F. Supp. at 589.
45. Indianapolis, 332 F. Supp. at 675-76. It was the so-called "Uni-Gov" Act which
actually brought about this change. Acts of 1969, ch. 173, at 357; BURNS IND. STAT. ANN.
§§ 48-9101-48-9507 (1970 Cum. Supp.), IND. CODE §§ 18-4-1-1 to 18-4-5-4 (1971).
46. - See pp. 1683-86 supra.
47. For discussion of the court of appeals opinion in Richmond, see pp. 1683.84 supra.
In Detroit the district judge's substantive findings on the constitutional violations are
contained in the Ruling on the Issue of Segregation, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
This ruling was specifically affirmed by the Sixth Circuit's cn bane opinion. Detroit,
Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 at 80 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973).
The Seventh Circuit affirmed each of the findings of the district court in Indianapolis.
Indianapolis, 474 F.2d at 88.
48. See Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 84, 91-92, 212-29; Detroit, 338 F. Supp. at 586-87;
Indianapolis, 332 F. Supp. at 661-63.
49. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 92; Detroit, 338 F. Supp. at 587.
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for segregated school patterns.50 Although segregated housing and seg-
regated schooling are undoubtedly related,51 for the purposes of the
argument here the former will be considered as a fixed background
against which the latter must be alleviated5 2
II. The State as "Hidden Defendant"
In the earliest school desegregation cases, where plaintiffs attacked
state statutes, the states through various officials were necessarily
parties to the suits.53 After the Supreme Court invalidated overt statu-
tory segregation and the furor of outright defiance had subsided, 4
the focus of the desegregation process centered on the local school
boards as the federal district courts assumed their roles as overseers
of the desegregation process.53
Beginning in 1955, and particularly after the movement toward
compliance began around 1960, state officials faded from the status
of involuntary defendants in desegregation litigation.r0  This is not
to say that they did not appear before courts in desegregation matters;
50. In Richmond the court of appeals let stand some findings on housing discrimina-
tion, but it rejected the theory that the counties were keeping blacks in Richmond schools
while allowing the whites to flee to relatively white sanctuaries. 462 F.2d at 1065.
The Sixth Circuit in Detroit did not rely at all upon testimony pertaining to segregated
housing except as to whether school construction programs helped cause or maintain such
segregation. Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 at 50 (6th Cir. June 12. 1973).
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district judge's findings as not clearly erroneous, een
though it recognized that other forces had had a significant impact on residential housing
patterns in Indianapolis. Indianapolis, 474 F.2d at 88-89.
51. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970), ajffd in part, rev'd
in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 41 U.S.LIV. 5002 (U.S. June 21, 1973). points
to the growing trend of erasing the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation
that had produced disparate results in the North and in the South. In Keyes the Supremc
Court, for the first time, held that actions of school officials producing segregated con-
ditions were just as much state action as statutorily required dual schools. Many of the
specific practices condemned by the Court in Keyes, particularly school construction
policies, gerrymandering of attendance zones, and the use of "optional zones." are iden-
tical to those identified and condemned in the three primary cases discussed in this
Note. See 41 U.S.L.W. at 5002.
52. One commentator on the Richmond case has viewed the explicit recognition of
the interrelationship between school and housing segregation as the major advance made
by the case. Comment, Comprehensive Metropolitan Planning: A Reinterpretation of
Equal Educational Opportunity, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 388 (1972).
53. Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was a consolidation of suits in four states seeking
to enjoin the enforcement of state statutes and, in three of the four states, state con-
stitutional provisions requiring segregation by race in public schools. 347 U.S. at 486 n.l.
54. For comprehensive discussion of the years of outright defiance see B. MuSE, TE.%
YEARS OF PRELUDE 1-209 (1964); A. LEWIs & THE NEW YORK TMEs, PORT&Arr OF A DE,,DL"
THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3-69 (1962); R. GTrs, THE MAYING OF MASSIVE RE-
SISTANCE: VIRGINIA'S POLMCS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEcREGATION, 1954-1956 (1962).
55. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), placed primary responsibility for compliance on the
local school authorities but required judicial supervision of the process. 349 U.S. at 299.
The district courts were also charged to retain jurisdiction of the cases. Id. at 301.
56. See B. MusE, supra note 54, at 210.
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rather, such appearances were occasioned by affirmative state inter-
ference in the desegregation process5 7 or by the state's voluntary deci-
sion to intervene in the litigation."8 Absent direct resistance by the state
to desegregation, the obligation to dismantle dual schools fell solely
upon local officials and the states were given the opportunity to avoid
defendant status in litigation.5 9 Thus, to a large extent, state officials
could remain behind the scenes and join the fray only when they
chose to do so.60
The consolidation cases have run counter to this trend. Although
no state officials were party to the original Richmond suit filed in
1961, the state board of education and state superintendent of public
instruction were joined as defendants in December 1970.01 In Detroit,
on the other hand, since the original complaint challenged the. con-
stitutionality of a 1970 Michigan statute, the governor, attorney gen-
eral, acting superintendent of public instruction and the state board
of education were defendants from the beginning.02 Indianapolis
followed the Richmond pattern, with the members of the state board
of education and the superintendent of public instruction added as
defendants following the filing of an amended complaint.03 Regard-
less of the pattern, at the remedy stage in each case state officials were
before the court in defendant status and therefore unquestionably
subject to the court's jurisdiction.
III. Attribution of Violations: The State as Defendant in Fact
There is no mention of local government in the United States Con-
stitution, which recognizes only the federal government and the states
as governing units.6 4 Counties, cities and towns are mere political
57. See, e.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), a]f'd
sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
58. In Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), no official of the state of
Virginia was named as a defendant even though the state policy of "freedom of choice"
was being challenged.
59. The administrative process, directed by the United States Office of Education, put
considerable pressure on state officials to comply with the 1966 "guidelines." See gen.
erally CIVIL RIGHTS 1960-66, at 413-16 (L. Sobel ed. 1967).
60. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the state of
North Carolina was not a defendant and the focus was exclusively on the local school
board. In a companion case, however, state officials were the original defendants and a
state statute was being challenged. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swaun, 402 U.S.
43 (1971). Nevertheless, the trend seemed clear that absent regressive action by state al-
thorities, the state could escape defendant status in desegregation suits.
61. Richmond, 51 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Va. 1970).
62. Detroit, 433 F.2d 897, 898 (6th Cir. 1970).
63. The amended complaint was filed October 22, 1971.
64. See Allen v. County School Bd., 207 F. Supp. 349, 354 (E.D. Va. 1962), rev'd sub
noin. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 332 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963), rev'd and district
court opinion reinstated, 337 U.S. 218 (1964).
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subdivisions of the state, created by the state as convenient agencies
for exercising governmental power.a A state may grant to them or
withhold from them powers and privileges as it sees fit.60 Since politi-
cal subdivisions are agencies of the states, officials of these subdivisions
are state agents, and their official actions are clearly official action of
the state.67This is particularly so in the field of education, where the
responsibility of the state is primary.68
But if these considerations and the attribution of local actions to
state officials establish that the states have always been defendants in
desegregation cases, it is only in the metropolitan cases that state of-
ficials and agencies 0 have been charged with affirmative rather than
merely negative duties.70
The most dramatic effect of such considerations is on the scope of
the remedy available. If the violation occurs at the state level and
the state is responsible for the violation, then the "affirmative duty"
to eliminate discrimination "root and branch" is the duty of state
officials,7 ' and not just of the local school board. A failure to discharge
this duty gives the court remedial power over state officials. Although
the alteration of school division boundaries is arguably beyond the
power of officials of any one division, or even of two adjoining divi-
sions, it is certainly within the power of the state.72
65. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
66. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923). See also Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207
(1903).
67. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
68. See note 36 supra.
69. Preliminarily it may appear that the Eleventh Amendment presents application
of the judicial power of the United States against one of the states. U.S. Co. sr. amend.
XI. This argument, however, has been advanced and rejected in the school desegregation
context. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1954). It was, however, raised
anew in Judge Weick's dissent in Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 at 104-07 (6th Cir. June
12, 1973).
70. In a predecessor of the three primary cases considered in this Note, United States
v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970), 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex.), aff'd in part,
modified and remanded, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971). cert. denied sub noin. Edgar v.
United States, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). the court found that the state had maintained segre-
gation by establishment and maintenance of a number of black school divisions. To
remedy the violation the district court required that each black district be annexed to
or consolidated with a nearby district to achieve desegregation. 330 F. Stipp. at 238.
See also Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), afJ'd sub nora.
Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
71. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
72. Without the state as defendant, the remedy of consolidation could conceivably be
limited to cases where there was a finding of collusion between the districts to establish
and maintain the boundaries.
The Sixth Circuit panel in its vacated opinion recognized that it was not necessary in
fashioning an equitable decree for the district court to find discriminatory conduct on
the part of each school district as a prerequisite to including such district in a desegre.
gation area to be defined by the court's decree. Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 at 68 (6th
Cir. Dec. 8, 1972). This point, however, does not appear in the en bane opinion. Detroit,
Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973).
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IV. The Remedy of Boundary Alteration
Judicial remedial power in cases involving racial discrimination is
guided by the traditional attributes of equity.73 These attributes in-
clude practicality and flexibility,7 4 and are not limited to restoration
of the status quo ante.75 The Supreme Court, however, in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, while specifically approv-
ing the remedial altering of school district and attendance zones as
an interim technique to accomplish school desegregation, cautioned
that the remedial judicial authority does not put judges in the shoes
of school authorities whose powers are plenary.70
The delineation of these competing considerations bearing on the
scope of relief has emerged slowly. Early cases dealt with dual schools
within a single district.77 More recently the Supreme Court has con-
demned the carving of two districts out of a single one during the
desegregation process.78 The distinguishing aspect of the consolidation
cases is the fact that the district boundaries are typically long-stand-
ingT and coincident with political boundaries.8 0 Additionally, the
concern with boundaries arose in the consolidation cases at the reme-
dial stage of litigation, for the initial concern was with the desegre-
gation of the central city schools. Only when city-bound remedies
proved ineffective did the courts and the parties widen their focus
to include suburban areas and the state school officials. In Wright v.
Council of the City of Emporia8 1 and United States v. Scotland Neck
Board of Educations2 the Court prohibited state and local officials
from creating a new school district from an existing district 3 because
the effect of the boundary alteration was detrimental to the process
of desegregation. Emporia marks the first time that the Supreme Court
73. Brown I1, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
74. See PoMERoy's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 109 (5th ed. 1941).
75. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573 n.8 (1972). See also Alexander
v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222 (1935).
76. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16, 27 (1971).
77. For a general overview of early school desegregation cases, see &enerally 11. MusE,
supra note 54, at 1-209; Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation, Progress and
Prospects, 64 COLUm. L. REV. 193 (1964); Pollack, Ten Years After, 24 FED. B.J. 123 (1964).
78. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scot.
land Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
79. In Richmond, however, the boundaries had been altered as recently as 1970, when
the city annexed a portion of Chesterfield County. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 76.
80. Indianapolis differs from Richmond and Detroit in this regard. In Indianapolis
the city itself extended its boundaries and consolidated with Marion County, but the
school district or "school city" was restricted to its previously existing boundaries.
Indianapolis, 332 F. Supp. at 675-76.
81. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
82. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
83. 407 U.S. at 453.
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considered the "effect"' 4 of school district boundaries, albeit only pro-
posed boundaries, between independent political subdivisions.85 The
"effect" test originated primarily in Green v. County School Board,"
where the Court endorsed the principle that the remedy should "so
far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well
as bar like discrimination in the future."
8 7
In justifying the alteration of school division boundaries, the dis-
trict judges in Richmond88 and Detroit9 placed considerable em-
phasis on Reynolds v. Sims ° and Gomillion v. Lightfoot."'
In Reynolds the Supreme Court discussed the instrumentality theory
of relationship between' the state and its political subdivisions.0 2 The
case stands for the proposition that a court can properly take action
to require a state, or an agency of a state, to alter district lines, in-
cluding those coincident with political subdivisions, when such ac-
tion is required to remedy deprivation of equal protection.
Gomillion also bears directly on boundary alteration. The Court,
dealing with gerrymandering of boundaries in Tuskegee, Alabama,
relied explicitly on the instrumentality theory and held that a state's
right to control its municipalities, and their boundaries, is circum-
scribed by the limitations imposed by the ConStitution. °a
In fact, the reapportionment cases provide precedent quite similar
in scope to the consolidation cases. In Reynolds the Court approved
the district court's interim implementation of its own reapportion-
ment plan pending submission and approval of a legislatively-devised
plan.94 The Sixth Circuit in Detroit also emphasized the legislative
role, placing primary responsibility on the Michigan legislature.
84. Id. at 462.
85. At the time of the court challenge, Emporia had become a "city of the second
class" which was "politically independent from the surrounding county . Id. at 454.
86. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
87. Id. at 438 n.4, quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
88. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67, 102-03.
89. Detroit, Ruling on Propriety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish
Desegregation of the Public Schools of the City of Detroit, Civil Action No. 35257 at 2.3
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 1972), vacated, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 (6th Cir. June 12. 1973).
90. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
91. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Gomillion is not wholly apposite, however. since it was decided
solely on the basis of the Fifteenth Amendment, rather than the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 345. See also id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
92. Political subdivisions of States-counties, cities, or whatever-never were and
never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather they have been traditionally
regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist
in the carrying out of state governmental functions.
377 U.S. at 575.
93. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960). The most recent reapportion-
ment decision, Mahan v. Howell, 93 S. Ct. 979 (1973), does not alter the previousl)-declarcd
remedial power of the Court. Id. at 985.
94. 377 U.S. at 586.
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Nevertheless it directed the district court to fashion a remedy if the
legislature failed to act, or acted in a manner inconsistent with effi-
cient elimination of the constitutional violationsoa The Richmond
district court, by contrast, ordered implementation of a desegregation
plan developed and submitted by the Richmond School Board.9
Although the legislative reapportionment cases do not provide an
exact parallel to metropolitan consolidation, they do indicate that the
instrumentality theory has been utilized in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment context. Moreover they emphasize that a state may be required
to restructure its political subdivision boundaries if such action is
necessary to eliminate a constitutional violation.
The Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted and applied in the re-
apportionment cases, does not require statewide elections for all of-
fices. Similarly, it does not require a uniform racial ratio in all public
schools within a state 7 nor statewide administration of public schools.
Individual school districts are constitutionally permissible, as long
as their maintenance does not perpetuate illegal segregation. How-
ever, if school district consolidation is to become a tool for elimination
of the vestiges of segregation, its limitations must be understood.
The minimum requirement of a remedial decree is that it include
"whatever steps might be necessary" to totally eliminate all vestiges
of a segregated system. 98 Determination of the actual scope of the
decree will turn on the standard of "effectiveness" by which any school
desegregation plan must be measured. 99 The remedy must be effective
in eliminating discrimination and effective in fostering quality educa-
tion. The former standard requires an area large enough to meet its
requirement; the latter requires that the area be of manageable size.
A possible index of the optimal size is pupil transportation time. °0
This index produces a better indicaiion of effectiveness than geo-
graphic size by taking into account such factors as decentralized sub-
divisions,' 0 ' transportation routes, and expressways. The district judge
95. Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 at 68 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973).
96. The Richmond metropolitan plan was prepared under the supervision of the as.
sociate superintendent of the Richmond public school system, Richmond, 338 F. Supp.
at 186, and was the only plan before the district court. Id. at 191.
97. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31.32 (1971).
98. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
99. See, e.g., Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971), cited ins Wright
v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972).
100. The Richmond district court pointed out that the maximum pupil transportation
time under the metropolitan plan would not exceed the currently allowable maximums
in the three affected divisions. Richmond, 338 F. Snpp. at 188. See the discussion of time
and distance limits in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 30.31.
101. The Richmond metropolitan plan divided the consolidated area into six sub-
divisions, roughly resembling spokes of a wheel emanating from the center of the city.
338 F. Supp. at 191.
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in Richmond utilized another standard which is certainly pertinent
in determining the consolidation area, that of interdependence and
community of interest between the school divisions. His extensive find-
ings of interdependence and basic unity were highlighted by the find-
ing that the racial proportions of the total pupil population in the
consolidation area had remained unchanged for ten years despite dra-
matic changes in the racial composition of the pupil population in
the city.
102
Metropolitan consolidation is certainly not a panacea for the ills of
segregated education. In the area of consolidation, probably more than
in any other area in the desegregation process, the requirement of a
finding of de jure segregation has imposed tremendous strain on the
judiciary. Although metropolitan consolidation makes great strides
toward dealing with the problem of remedy, it has no bearing upon
the issue of de jure versus de facto segregation which contributes great-
ly to a disparity of results in areas of similar racial composition. Ad-
ditionally, the remedy acts only peripherally on such problems as the
increasing proliferation of segregationist private academies. 0 3 More-
over, the courts, as the branch of government with the smallest popu-
lar base of support, are particularly illadapted to structure and en-
force far-reaching social science solutions to societal problems, par-
ticularly when the social sciences lead to indeterminant results.104 In
this regard, the Sixth Circuit opinion in Detroit, which placed primary
responsibility for the elimination of the constitutional violations upon
the state legislature,10 5 makes the most effective bid for popular sup-
port.
Despite the theoretical and practical considerations which neces-
sarily influence the fashioning of judicial decrees, constitutional prin-
ciples do not depend upon sociological underpinnings for their stand-
102. Id. at 178-79, 185. See note 17 supra.
103. See Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE U.J. 1436 (1973).
104. The Coleman Report, J. COLEUMAN, ET AL, EqUALrrY OF EnurTrioN Oi oTurry
(HEW 1966), has stimulated a multitude of views on the role of education in remcdying
social problems. See, e.g., U.S. Com.tItssION ON CIVIL Rlcirrs, REPORT ON RACIAL ISOLATION
IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967); C. JEN KS, M. S.NtM, H. AcI.AN, M. BANE, D. CoHLE, H.
Gnr-ms, B. HEYNS & S. MICHELSON, INEqUALITY: A R.AS ESS.MIENr OF THE EFFECr OF FAMILY
AND SCHOOLING IN AMERIcA (1972); ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OionTuNrry (F. Mos.
teller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972); Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 ThE Punuc INTESST
90 (1969).
105. This opinion heretofore has emphasized that the Legislature of Michigan has
an opportunity to determine the organizational and governmental structure of an
enlarged desegregation area to remedy the unconstitutional segregation results set
forth in this opinion. In the event the Legislature fails to act effectively and expe-
ditiously, the foregoing and other cases cited in this opinion outline the broad scope
of equitable relief that may be fashioned by the District Court in this case on
remand ....
Detroit, Nos. 72-1809-72-1814 at 79-80 (6th Cir. June 12, 1973). See also id. at 68.
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ing. The principle remains that constitutional violations call for reme-
dial response, and that the remedy must eliminate the violation.
V. Pupil Exchange: A Possible Middle Ground
Metropolitan consolidation has often been viewed as an all or noth-
ing proposition. This is perhaps unfortunate and to some extent short-
sighted. In Richmond, the only case to date ordering implementation
of a comprehensive consolidation plan, the court merely approved and
ordered implementation of the only plan which it had before it.100
The district judge, however, explicitly indicated his willingness to
entertain motions for changes in the plan. 107
Once the constitutional violations have been established, and- the
responsibility of the state in formulating relief recognized, the relief
itself is flexible. Indeed, virtually any remedy that results in eliminat-
ing the violation is acceptable. In this regard, the pupil exchanges
between city and suburban areas' 08 or even partial consolidation or
annexation are possibilities.
VI. Conclusion
The metropolitan consolidation cases which will follow Richmond
require that the courts address the issues left unresolved there. When
the inquiry is focused on the state board of education, armed as it is
with plenary powers over education in the state, it becomes clear that
remedial powers are not bounded by local school division lines. More-
over, local political entities are mere instrumentalities of the state.
The duty and obligation to remedy constitutional violations rests
where the Fourteenth Amendment places it: upon the state.
106. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. at 191.
107. Id. at 230.
108. Such exchanges have been used in both Richmond and Detroit in the past. See
p. 1685 supra.
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